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1. Introduction
According to moral realists such as Richard W. Miller, Nicholas
Sturgeon, Peter Railton, Richard Boyd, and David Brink,
various parts of the world have certain moral properties
independently of whether anyone believes that they do, and
these moral properties help explain certain things that people
do. 1 These moral realists seem to have causal explanations in
mind, and sometimes they state explicitly that moral properties
have effects on human behavior.'
In this paper, I will try to motivate skepticism about the
causal efficacy of moral properties in two ways. First, I will
highlight a tension that arises between two claims that moral
realists may want to accept. The first claim is that physically
indistinguishable things do not differ in any causally efficacious
respect. The second claim is that physically indistinguishable
things that differ in certain historical respects have different
moral properties. The tension arises to the extent to which
these different moral properties are supposed to have different
effects on people. I will introduce a class of cases in which this
tension arises and suggest that the moral properties in these
cases have no causal power. I will also question whether there
are differences between the moral properties in these cases and
moral properties in other cases that do not involve physically
indistinguishable things that could make the latter moral
properties causally efficacious.
The second way that I will try to motivate skepticism
consists in pointing out a unique feature of cases in which
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moral properties are supposed both to supervene on historical
properties and to be causally efficacious. These cases allow us
to change moral properties with alleged effects while we hold
constant the nonmoral candidates for causal contribution to
those effects. This feature of these cases is unique because in
most other cases the moral properties supervene on the
physical properties in the nonmoral candidates, such that we
cannot change the former while holding constant the latter.
This way of changing moral properties provides empirical
grounds for testing their causal efficacy.
2. An Assumption about Historical Properties
I assume that historical properties are causally ineffica-
cious and that physically indistinguishable things that differ
in their historical properties do not differ in any causally
efficacious respect. Let me clarify how I will be using these
claims and begin by quoting two people who have made them.
Beds that were slept in by George Washington may command a
higher price than those that lack this historical property, but
presumably this is a result, not of any causal potentialities in
the beds themselves, but of the historical beliefs and interests of
those who buy and sell them. (Shoemaker 1980, 121)
The cashier accepts my $100 bill because she thinks it is
genuine, and she thinks it is genuine, not because it is genuine
(a fact V [for value] about the history of this paper), but because
it looks genuine (a fact C [for cause] about its intrinsic proper-
ties). Even if it was an authorized government agency that
caused it to look this way, it is the fact that it looks this way, not
the fact that an authorized agency made it look this way (the
fact on which the value of the paper supervenes) that explains
the cashier's coming to believe that it is genuine and, hence, her
reaction to it. (Dretske 1990, 8)
Uncles, dollar bills, and divorcees can cause lots of trouble, but
the fact that they are (as opposed to being believed to be) uncles,
dollar bills, and divorcees, does not explain their various effects
on the world.... These effects are to be explained, instead, by the
intrinsic properties of uncles, dollar bills, and divorcees.... So,
since counterfeit-good counterfeit (i.e., paper having the same
intrinsic properties)-is as effective in obtaining coats and
groceries as is real money, the property of being real money adds
nothing to the paper's causal powers. (Dretske 1998, 521)3
It is not easy to find in print disagreements with these
claims and assertions that historical properties have causal
power. Michael Tooley (1972, 286-287) and J. L. Mackie (1973,
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130-131) seem to be two examples. Let us call this the histor-
ical view. For purposes of illustration, consider two physically
indistinguishable paintings that are each in the centers of
physically indistinguishable rooms at a time T. Suppose that
these paintings have different historical properties, such as
having been touched by different people and produced in
different ways. The issue here is not whether different
methods of production, for example, can affect present causal
powers. The issue is whether such differences can do so even if
there are no physical effects or traces of them involved in the
present.
Now suppose that we bring a mirror (or a camera or a
camcorder or a computer with a video camera or a human
being) into one of the rooms and place it in front of one of the
paintings. According to the historical view, we should take
seriously the possibility that the different historical properties
of the paintings could produce different images in the mirror. Of
course, it takes time for light to travel from the surfaces of the
paintings to the mirror. In these terms, the historical view
suggests that we take seriously the possibility that the different
historical properties of the paintings could have different effects
on the quality of the light that reflects onto the mirror.
On an alternative view, the physical properties of the
paintings, combined with such contemporaneous properties as
the atmosphere in the room, wholly determine the causal
powers of the paintings and the effects on the mirror. Let us
call this the physical view. As Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson
(1982) point out, this view does not require determinism. We
can restate it in terms of the physically indistinguishable
paintings having the same probabilistic dispositions regardless
of their historical properties.'
Now suppose that we bring the mirror in front of the first
painting to see what image it produces, and, then, we produce
a physical change in the mirror, such as a crack in it. Next, we
bring the mirror in front of the second painting, and we see
that it produces a different image. The historical view suggests
that we take seriously the possibility that the different
historical properties of the paintings are causally responsible
for the differences in the effects that the paintings have on the
mirror. On the physical view, even though the physical
properties of the paintings may be causally responsible for the
different images, it is the physical difference in the mirror
that makes the different causal contribution to those different
effects. Since the physical properties of the paintings make the
same causal contribution to the different effects, it is the
physical difference in the mirror that is causally responsible
for the difference in the effects. The historical properties of the
paintings (and the mirror) contribute nothing to, and do no
causal work in bringing about, those effects."
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As Shoemaker and Dretske assume in the examples with
which this section began, these claims apply to humans as well
as mirrors. Suppose that someone has different beliefs about
two physically indistinguishable paintings (or beds or $100
bills)-namely, she believes that one is an original, one is a
replica, and the original is worth more money than the replica.
These different beliefs are analogous to the physical difference
in the mirror. Suppose that this person offers more money for
the original than the replica. Although the physical properties
of the original and the replica may make causal contributions
to, and be causally responsible for, the person's different offers,
it is something about the physical properties of the person that
is causally responsible for the difference in the offers. I shall
continue to assume in these terms that the historical properties
themselves do no causal work, particularly in cases that involve
human behavior.
I propose to show how analogous claims apply to certain
moral cases. My strategy is to describe physically indistin-
guishable things that differ in their moral properties in much
the same way that these beds and paintings differ in their
historical properties. If a person forms a belief about or
responds in a certain way to these subjects of moral properties,
it is something about the person's brain or psychology
(combined with the nonhistorical properties of the subjects) that
is causally responsible for that belief or response. More
particularly, the historical beliefs and interests of the person,
rather than the historical properties of the beds-c do the causal
work in bringing about the different money offers in the bed
case. Similarly, the moral beliefs and interests of the person,
rather than the moral properties of the moral subjects, do the
causal work in bringing about the different effects that the
moral properties are supposed to have on the person. I will fine-
tune the moral cases in specific ways and for purposes that I
will try to make clear, but these differences will not affect the
basic strategy of apportioning causal responsibility with
disregard to historical properties.
3. A Sample Case
Suppose that, at a time T, every person present in a parti-
cular society is barely conscious and dying from disease as a
result of overwork and malnutrition. We can imagine the same
state of affairs arising from different histories and thereby
possessing different historical properties. In one history, at an
earlier time T-n, the society consists of a large group of
struggling farm workers and a small affluent group of farm
owners. The small group made voluntary contracts with the
struggling farmers. These contracts consisted of little pay in
exchange for long hours of work. Soon all the farmers were
overworked to the point of severe illness and the depletion of
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all natural resources. Although the small affluent group had
enough medicine to heal everyone and enough seeds to plant
new crops, they had made no agreements to do any such thing.
After their castle accidentally burns down, they decide to leave
the workers for dead and move on to strike up a similar deal
in another society.
In a second, alternative history, at the same earlier time T-n,
by majority rule a society of mostly impoverished farmers voted
to distribute what little resources they had in a Rawlsian
fashion. Although not everyone agreed with this arrangement,
the minority complied after considering the societal punishment
for noncompliance with majority votes. These egalitarian
farmers shared every resource available and tried to follow
proper agricultural techniques. However, their storage sheds
burned down and other misfortunes such as unfavorable
weather eventually led to malnutrition and disease. Despite
their cooperation and hard work, at T everyone lies barely
conscious and dying.
Suppose that these two states of affairs do not differ in any
physical respect. The sick bodies, for instance, lie in the same
positions. The affluent group had built their castle in the same
area where the egalitarians had built their storage sheds.
Each fire left the ground below it in the same condition. And
so on. Suppose further that in each of these states of affairs,
infection and high fever has caused the same thorough brain
damage, such that there are no differing memories or inactive
brain states.
Although these two states of affairs do not differ in any
physical respect, many people may believe that they differ in
their moral properties." If we change the history in the first
society to include torture, slave trade, and physically coerced
work in place of libertarian agreements and transfers, almost
everyone would believe that the states of affairs at T differ in
their moral properties.
4. Analysis of the Sample Case
Recall that, on the realist view under question, parts of the
world have certain moral properties independently of whether
anyone believes that they do, and these moral properties cause
some people to do certain things. For instance, suppose that, at
T-n, a Rawlsian walks into the inegalitarian farming society
with the first history. She feels and expresses moral outrage at
the injustice that she sees in the society. Later, at T, she
returns to check on the farmers. She feels even more upset
about the moral badness that she sees in the society. As a
result, she begins a search for the small group of affluent
farmers to express moral condemnation to them in person.
According to Miller, Sturgeon, Railton, and Brink, in cases
like this the Rawlsian's responses to the conditions in the first
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society were caused by the existence of injustice in it, and an
explanation of her responses includes reference to the exis-
tence of this moral property as a cause." However, suppose
further that, at both T-n and T, the same Rawlsian walked into
the more egalitarian farming society with the second history.
She feels and does very different things in connection with the
justice and later tragedy that she sees in the society, such as
first praising and later paying sad tribute to the farmers' just
and valiant efforts. According to these moral realists, presum-
ably, this instance of justice is relevant as a cause in the
explanation of the Rawlsian's behavior,"
When the Rawlsian enters the two societies at T, however,
the only things with different causal powers in or regarding
the two societies are the Rawlsian's different mental or brain
states. In each case the Rawlsian has different memories and
beliefs about what events led up to the societal conditions that
she sees. More importantly, she has both different beliefs
about the morality of those conditions and different desires
regarding what she wants to do about them.
To be sure, the physical features of the two societies make
the same causal contributions to the Rawlsian's sense organs.
Although these indistinguishable societal features may be
causally responsible for the Rawlsian's different responses to
them, it is the differences in the Rawlsian's psychology (or
neurology, if you prefer) that make the different causal contri-
butions to, and hence are causally responsible for, the differ-
ences in her responses.
On the moral realist view, presumably, the different proper-
ties of injustice and justice at T supervene on the different
historical properties of the (physical features of the) two
societies. A moral realist might also claim that these different
moral properties are causally responsible for the Rawlsian's
responses at T even though the differences in the Rawlsian's
psychology are causally responsible for the differences in her
responses. One reason to question the plausibility of this claim
is that the historical properties of the two societies at T do not
do any causal work in bringing about the Rawlsian's respon-
ses." If they don't, then it is not clear how any moral proper-
ties that supervene on them could do any causal work in
bringing about the responses either. 10
On the other hand, the features of the two societies at T-n
on which injustice and justice are also supposed to supervene,
such as the different economic distributions and social
relations, do differ in their causal powers. Recall that the more
equal economic distribution in the second society is fair or just
according to a Rawlsian theory, and the less equal distribution
in the other society is not. However, it's not clear why we
should believe that these different moral properties make any
causal contributions to, or are causally responsible for, the
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Rawlsian's responses at this time (T-n). Why should the
Rawlsian's psychology and the physical features of the societies
be causally responsible for the Rawlsian's responses at T but
not at T-n? Why should the properties of injustice and justice
be causally efficacious at T-n but not at T? At what point in
the history of these two societies would the causal efficacy of
the moral properties change, and how could it do so? We can
raise the same questions about how the different moral
properties could make the different causal contributions to,
and hence be causally responsible for, the differences in the
Rawlsian's responses at T-n.
5. Extrapolation from the Sample Case
In principle, we can apply this argument to any case in
which a moral property of something outside of a person's
body at a time T is supposed to cause that person to do
something. What we need to do is imagine a change in the
historical properties of the subject of the moral property at a
time T-n in such a way that (1) we would want to say that this
subject has a different moral property at T-n and the same
different moral property at T, and (2) according to moral
realism, the different moral properties have the same kinds of
different effects on the person at both times. If historical
properties are causally inefficacious, then the only candidates
for causal responsibility for the differences in the effects are
the people or their psychology, and the only candidates for
causal responsibility for the effects themselves are the
nonhistorical properties of the moral subjects. 11
In practice, however, we probably cannot apply this
argument to the vast majority of moral cases. Although many
cases of moral properties appear to supervene on historical
properties, we usually need to see changes in more than
historical properties before we see changes in moral properties.
When we change the physical properties at T-n that are
required for different moral properties, we will also be changing
the physical properties at T. For instance, the moral status of
keeping people in prison depends on their current psychology as
well as their past actions, and prisoners ordinarily do not have
identical psychologies or physically indistinguishable brains.
Nonetheless, notice that the argument does not depend on a
Rawlsian conception of justice or morality. In the case of states
of affairs and the two farming societies, for example, at T-n the
more equal economic distribution in the second society is unfair
or unjust according to a libertarian or Nozickian theory, and the
less equal economic distribution in the first society is not. So
the moral properties that a Nozickian would see in the two
societies at T-n and T would be reversed from those that a
Rawlsian would see, and, we can imagine, her reactions to them
at both times would differ in correspondingly reversed ways.
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A crucial question here is whether this strategy points to the
causal inefficacy of moral properties in general rather than just
to that of the particular moral properties in the cases to which
it is applied. The answer depends on whether the causal
efficacy, or even the moral properties themselves, alleged in
such particular cases differs in some metaphysically significant
way from the causal efficacy alleged in the many cases for
which the strategy will not work. Miller's sample cases include
civil rights violations in seventeenth century England (1979,
254-55), slavery (1985, 527), and Nazi involvement in Hungary
(1992, 46-54). Sturgeon's cases include slavery (1985, 245-46;
1991,28-30), someone harming a cat (1986, 70-75), and poverty
(1986, 75; 1991,36 n. 16). Railton's more general case involves
the societal discounting of the interests of certain groups and
departures from an impartial social perspective with equal
concern for everyone affected (1986, 189-94). Finally, Brink's
cases include apartheid in South Africa (1989, 187-92).
Should it make a difference whether enslaved, impover-
ished, exploited, or discounted people have been pushed to
severe illness and the brink of death? If anything, the features
of my sample case would otherwise seem to strengthen the
case for both the existence of the moral properties in them and
the alleged accompanying power to cause people to do certain
things, such as opposing slavery, deciding not to lend support
or prestige to a particular government, and forming moral
beliefs about individuals, actions, and distributions. The sorts
of features that appear to lead moral realists to postulate the
presence of moral properties and their effects on people are
not removed or altered by the details required for imagining
cases in which the above argument works.
6. Changing the Moral Candidate for
Causal Contribution While Holding
Constant the Nonmoral Candidates
Moral realists, and common people, often explain a person's
behavior by pointing to the presence or instantiation of a
particular moral property in that person's environment as a
cause. Moral anti-realists explain the same behavior by
pointing to the person's beliefs (or psychology, which includes
the person's emotions, desires, unconscious beliefs, and so on),
and to the physical properties of the person's environment as
causes. Moral realists do not deny that the person's beliefs and
those physical properties play an important causal role. The
disagreement is over whether the moral property in the moral
explanans does any causal work that we cannot wholly
account for with the nonmoral explanans.
Sturgeon argues that moral properties do this causal work
by appealing to a counterfactual test for explanatory relevance.
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According to this test, if a moral property of something such as
an act (or an economic distribution or a societal state of affairs)
were irrelevant in explaining a person's response to that act,
then the person would have responded in the same way even if
the act did not have that moral property. For instance, suppose
that Jane sees Albert torturing a cat, and Jane forms the belief
that Albert's torturous act is wrong." Sturgeon says that the
actual wrongness of Albert's act caused Jane to believe that it
was wrong and that this wrongness is relevant in explaining
Jane's belief.
In this case, Sturgeon's counterfactual test says that if the
wrongness of Albert's act were irrelevant in explaining Jane's
belief about it, then Jane would have formed the same belief
even if Albert's act had not been wrong. Sturgeon's argument
proceeds with two steps. First, since moral properties supervene
on natural properties, in order to imagine a case in which the
act has a different moral property, we are supposed to have to
imagine a different act, such as Albert petting the cat. Second,
if we imagine a different act with a different moral property,
then we are supposed to be imagining an act that Jane would
not have responded to in the same way. Sturgeon concludes that
since Jane would not have responded in the same way to the
case in which the moral property was not present as she
responded in the case in which it was present, the moral
property passes his test for explanatory relevance.
This is a powerful argument. It's not clear what it shows,
however, in the many cases in which the moral property is
supposed to supervene on the physical properties of the environ-
ment that are cited in the nonmoral explanans. In these cases,
it's not clear whether the argument shows that the moral
property or the physical properties are making the causal dif-
ference to the alleged effect of the moral property. In order to
make this clear, we need to modify Sturgeon's test so that it
requires us to change the moral property while holding constant
all of the properties in the nonmoral explanans. The point of
Sturgeon's argument seems to be that we cannot do this when
the former supervenes on the latter. In these terms, Sturgeon's
argument does not show that any moral properties pass the test.
Rather, the point seems to be that most moral properties do not
pass or fail the test, since we cannot carry it out on them.
We can carry out the test, however, in certain cases in which
moral properties are supposed to supervene on historical
properties. In these cases, we can imagine that the subject of
the moral property has a different moral property without
imagining that the subject differs in any of its properties that
are cited in the nonmoral explanans. We can carry out the test
and change the moral property in this way by changing the
historical properties on which it supervenes, since the nonmoral
explanans does not include these historical properties.
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The question is whether the person would respond differ-
ently, not because we have changed the nonmoral candidates
for causal contribution but because we have changed the
moral candidate. Since the nonmoral explanans includes the
person's beliefs, this question requires us to imagine a case
in which the person has the same beliefs about the subjects
of historical properties but also in which those subjects have
different historical properties. This kind of case should not be
too difficult to imagine, since many people form false beliefs
about historical properties under a variety of circumstances.
Notice that it is assumed in my sample cases that the
Rawlsian's beliefs about historical properties are true. In the
spirit of Sturgeon's counterfactual test, let us imagine some
variations in which the Rawlsian's beliefs are false. Suppose
that the two societies that I describe in section 3 occupy
different regions of space at the same times. Recall that the
spatial regions occupied by the two societies have different
physical features at T-n but not at T. On a Rawlsian or a
Nozickian view, the states of affairs in these societies have
different moral properties at both times. Suppose that a
different Rawlsian walks into each society at T-n, and they each
return as planned to the respective societies at T. The Rawlsian
who visits the egalitarian society responds first at T-n by
praising and encouraging and later at T by praising and paying
sad tribute to, the society members. The Rawlsian who visits
the inegalitarian society responds first at T-n by feeling and
expressing moral outrage to the opulent society members and
later at T by setting out to express moral condemnation to them
in person.
Now suppose that both Rawlsians unknowingly get lost after
T-n and each winds up entering the other society for the first
time at T. They each enter the respective societies with the false
beliefs that they had visited them before, that the conditions
that they see are a result of the conditions that they saw at T-n,
and so on. Presumably, this switch has no effect on the different
moral properties of the spatially different societal states of
affairs. Apart from the Rawlsians and their brains, the switch
has no effect on the physical features or the histories of the
different societal states.
We are now ready to see whether the moral properties in
these two societies at T pass the modified version of Sturgeon's
counterfactual test. We have two cases in which both the
moral property in the moral explanans is different and the
nonmoral properties in the nonmoral explanans are the same.
According to the test, if the first Rawlsian responds in the
same way in the case in which she unknowingly gets lost as she
responds in the case in which she does not get lost, then the
moral property in the case in which she does not get lost is not
explanatorily relevant. The same goes for the other Rawlsian.
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It's an empirical question how the Rawlsians would respond.
If the moral properties are causally inefficacious, then we
should not expect their absence to make a difference to the
Rawlsians' responses. To be sure, if the moral properties are
causally efficacious, then we might expect both the Rawlsian
who unknowingly enters the egalitarian society (but thinks that
she is entering the Nozickian society) to respond with praise
and comradeship, and we might expect the Rawlsian who
unknowingly enters the Nozickian society (but thinks that she
is entering the egalitarian society) to respond with blame and
protest. In the least, if the moral properties are causally
efficacious, then we might expect both the Rawlsian who
unknowingly enters the egalitarian society to respond with less
blame and protest, and we would expect the Rawlsian who
unknowingly enters the Nozickian society to respond with less
praise and comradeship.
Of course, we can similarly test whether the Rawlsians'
beliefs (and psychology) in the nonmoral explanans are
explanatorily relevant by looking to see what happens when we
hold constant the moral property in the moral explanans and
change the Rawlsians' beliefs. Suppose that, shortly after T-n,
each of the Rawlsians hears about the other society with the
different moral property and decides to visit it for the first
time at T. Suppose that the Rawlsians unknowingly get lost and
wind up returning at T to the same societies that they left at T-
n. They each enter the respective societies with the false beliefs
that they had not visited them before, that the conditions that
they see are the result of the conditions that they had heard
about in the other society around T-n, and so on.
If the moral properties but not the Rawlsians' beliefs are
causally inefficacious, then we should expect the Rawlsians'
responses (to what they each believe to be a different moral
property) to change along with their false historical and moral
beliefs, even though the moral properties in the respective
societies that they return to remain the same. As in the other
scenario, if the moral properties are causally efficacious, then
we might expect both the Rawlsian in the Nozickian society to
respond with less blame or protest and the Rawlsian in the
egalitarian society to respond with less praise and comrade-
ship than they would have responded with if they each had
not gotten lost and entered the societies with the moral
properties that are supposed to cause the opposite sorts of
responses.
7. Conclusion
It's an empirical question what results we would see in these
cases. Suppose that the responses would correspond to the
moral beliefs rather than the moral properties and that the best
explanation of these results is that the moral properties are
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causally inefficacious. We can return to the question that we
asked in section 5 about the argument in section 4. Do the
reasons for believing in the causal inefficacy of the moral
properties in these cases apply to other cases in which moral
properties do not supervene on different historical properties of
physically indistinguishable things? I have four considerations
to suggest in favor of generalizing the explanation and
argument.
First, as suggested in section 5, it seems as though the same
features that lead moral realists to posit the causal efficacy of
moral properties in physically distinguishable cases are present
in the physically indistinguishable cases. Second, as suggested
at the end of section 4, it seems as though the different moral
properties of the two societies at T-n that supervene on
physically distinguishable properties are causally inefficacious.
It's not clear why the nonmoral properties should be causally
responsible for the alleged effects of the moral properties at T
but not at T-n, and it's not clear how the moral properties could
be causally efficacious at T-n but not at T. At what point
between T-n and T would the causal efficacy of the moral
properties change, and how could it do so? Even if the features
that lead moral realists to posit the causal efficacy of moral
properties in their preferred cases are not present in the two
societies at T, it seems at least more likely that they are present
in the two societies at T-n.
The third consideration involves a way to run the first two
considerations from the present to the future even if we cannot
run them from the present to the past. In other words, suppose
that we have a moral property that is supposed to have an
effect on a person at a time T, and we cannot imagine a change
in the historical properties of the subject of the moral property
at a time T-n in such a way that (1) we would want to say that
this subject has a different moral property at T-n and the same
different moral property at T, and (2) according to moral
realism, the different moral properties have the same kinds of
different effects on the person at both times. Nonetheless, we
might still be able to imagine a physically different subject of a
different moral property at T in such a way that (1) we would
want to say that, at a future time T+n, these two subjects are
physically indistinguishable and have the same moral
properties that they had at T, and (2) according to moral
realism, these different moral properties have the same kinds of
different effects on the person at both times. If so, we can apply
the claims in section 4 to these cases.
Finally, the fourth consideration involves the modified
version of Sturgeon's counterfactual test in section 6. Recall
that, on this version, Sturgeon's argument does not really show
that any moral properties pass the test. Rather, it shows that
most moral properties do not pass or fail the test, since we
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cannot carry it out on them. If this is a plausible test, and if we
cannot carry it out in most cases, it seems a plausible
conjecture that we should pay attention to cases in which we
can. I have tried in this paper to introduce one class of these
cases. Although there may be others, they seem to constitute a
small percentage of moral cases. Nonetheless, it does not seem
implausible to suppose that the moral properties in these cases
will always fail the test. It's not clear how to balance a large
number of moral cases not passing or failing the test with a
small number failing it, but skepticism seems to be a
reasonable option. 13
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5 For assertion and discussion of this claim, see Shoemaker 1980,
Dretske 1990, 1998, Kim 1991, Enc and Adams 1992, and Antony
1996. It does not mean that past intrinsic and contemporaneous
relational properties are not explanatorily relevant. Indeed, the
indistinguishable features of the paintings have different causes in
many of them. Rather, this means that the historical properties in the
present of having had or having been affected by those nonhistorical
properties in the past do not do any causal work in bringing about the
effects on the mirror. Dretske and Kim seem clear on making and
separating these points.
6 Actually, it would be enough for my purposes if the features in
each society did not differ in any physical respect that is believed to be
morally relevant. Barely conscious people, for example, probably do not
need to be lying in the same positions.
7 Miller (1979, 255; 1992, 60, 63-64), Sturgeon (1985, 245; 1986,
75; 1991: 27-29, 36 n. 16; 1992, 97-98), Railton (1986, 191-192), and
Brink (1989, 187) seem to suggest that injustice can cause people to do
just or morally good things, such as condemn or oppose the injustice.
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Miller (1979,255), Sturgeon (1986, 70-75), and Railton (1986, 191-
192) seem to suggest that injustice or moral badness can cause people
to form beliefs about such injustice or badness, and Sturgeon and
Brink seem to claim that one person's morally bad character can both
cause that person to believe or do something bad (Sturgeon 1985, 244,
249; 1986, 75; 1992,97-98; Brink 1989, 187), and cause another person
to believe that the first person has a bad character (Sturgeon 1985,
234,243; Brink 1989, 187). In addition, Boyd (1988, 193-195,209-214)
claims that moral properties make causal contributions to the use of
moral terms-with increasing accuracy in reference, no less.
B Brink (1989, 187) and Sturgeon (1991, 29; 1992,98, 105-106)
seem to claim that social justice causes social stability, and Miller
(1987, 111-113; 1992, 46, 49-54, 63-64), Brink (1989, 187), and
Sturgeon (1992, 97-98) seem to claim that a person's morally good
character can cause that person to do something morally good, such as
oppose or condemn an injustice. Since Railton (1986, 191-192), Brink
(1989, 187), and Sturgeon (1991, 27-30, 36 n. 16) also seem to speak of
opposition to or condemnation of injustice as a case of social injustice
causing social instability, it seems a plausible conjecture that they
would speak of praising or paying tribute to just people or just
arrangements as a case of either social justice causing the sorts of
things that ordinarily contribute to social stability, or what moral
realists would otherwise regard as an effect of justice. To be sure,
Sturgeon 1992 (98, 122 n. 5) cites as an example of what he has in
mind by justice causing stability John Rawls's early conception of a
stable society, according to which sentiments of concern that support
just arrangements playa significant role. In addition, notice that
Sturgeon (1992, 112 n. 10, 115 n. 24) registers agreement with Boyd
(1988). Boyd appears both (1) to use an empirical and social account of
nonmoral human goodness to define analytically moral goodness in
terms of a social conception of the maximization of nonmoral human
goodness (1988, 203, 207, 209, 224-225), and (2) to claim that moral
goodness (or badness) normally causes people to sympathize with
moral subjects and act accordingly in the same perceptual way, I take
it, that edible food normally causes people to see and smell edible
things, and eat accordingly (214-215).
9 As stated in note 5, for assertion and discussion of this claim, see
Shoemaker 1980, Dretske 1990, 1998, Kim 1991, Enc and Adams 1992,
and Antony 1996. Dretske (1990, 6-8) makes precisely this claim about
cases in which value supervenes on historical properties. See also
Dretske 1998, 516-523.
10 Notice a disanalogy that obtains between the example of the
societies and the example of the paintings from section 2. On the
one hand, the physical features of the societies at T-n are causally
responsible for the memories and beliefs that the Rawlsian has at T,
and these memories and beliefs are substantially causally respon-
sible for the Rawlsian's responses at T. On the other hand, the
physical features of the paintings at earlier times are not causally
responsible for the physical features of the mirror at later times.
Nonetheless, if we accept the assumption about the causal ineffi-
cacy of historical properties, we can still say that the causal efficacy
of the intrinsic properties at T-n does not confer causal efficacy on
the historical properties at T (of having had those intrinsic
properties at T.n). Cf. note 5.
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11 Perhaps the nonhistorical properties of the moral subjects, such
as the physical features of the two societies at T and T-n, are only
causally responsible for the effects that they have on the people's
sense organs, and that the people, or some aspect of their bodies or
minds, are causally responsible both for their responses, and for the
differences in their responses, to the moral subjects. On the other
hand, Miller (1978, 403-414; 1987, 116-118) has argued that
correctly identifying certain people and their conscious psychology as
the actual causes of social phenomena leaves those phenomena
unexplained when they would have occurred anyway in the absence
of those particular causes. Miller (1987, 86-98) also argues that
standards of explanatory adequacy for causal descriptions are
different for different fields, times, and practical interests. Even on
this broad account of explanation, however, the actual causal factors
singled out for description must be causally sufficient to bring about
the explanandum (1987, 87, 91) even if they do not constitute an
adequate explanans (1978,402-404, 412-413). The moral properties
in my sample case do not meet this criterion. In addition, I imagine
that most moral anti-realists would be glad both to expand their
explanans of the alleged effects of moral properties on human
behavior to include such things as unconscious motives and social
functions, and to assert that other people would behave in similar
ways under similar circumstances. These inclusions and assertions
seem to point to explanatory facts about human psychology and
social relations, not, as Miller (1985, 527-528, 553-554; 1987, 111-
113; 1992, 54-60) suggests, to facts about moral properties. To be
sure, notice that Miller gives unconscious factors more weight in his
account of social explanation (1978, 393-395, 397-398, 411-412;
1987, 116) than in his account of moral detection (1992, 60-76, esp.
63-65, 69). Presumably, he sees no imbalance here because (1) he
believes that the methodological motivation for rejecting moral
explanations does not apply to social explanations, and (2) he takes
acceptance of social explanations to preclude rejection of moral
explanations. One reason not to be moved by (1) that I will discuss in
section 6 is that we may have empirical, rather than methodological,
reasons for rejecting moral explanations. One reason not to be moved
by (2) is that we may be able to construe social explanations as one
kind or feature of nonmoral explanations that include in their
nonmoral explanans unconscious motives, social circumstances, and
the intrinsic properties of past social circum-stances (as opposed to
the historical properties of present ones) as candidates for causal
contribution to the alleged effects of moral properties.
12 This example comes from Harman 1977 (4-5, 7-9) and 1986 (59-
64). For his discussion of it, see Sturgeon 1985 (232-233, 246-250),
1986 (70-75).
13 Thanks to Lara Denis, James Klagge, David Robb, and P. Kyle
Stanford for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks to
Joel Kupperman, Thomas Bontly, John Troyer, Gunnar Bjornsson,
and members of the University of Connecticut Philosophy Depart-
ment for comments on more recent versions. Thanks also to Helen
Gladish Adam Potthast.
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